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Low Inflation:
The Surprise of the 1990s
Dean Croushore*
Over the past six years, inflation has been
stable or declining in the United States. But over
that period, economic forecasters continually
predicted an upturn in inflation that never ma-
terialized. Is inflation now behaving differently
than it did in prior decades?  Or are the fore-
casters using inadequate models?
The persistent errors in the forecasts of in-
flation are disturbing.  Forecasters had done an
outstanding job of projecting inflation prior to
the 1990s, as I described in my 1996 article, “In-
flation Forecasts: How Good Are They?” Sta-
tistical tests discussed in that article verify that
over a long period, forecasts of inflation were
unbiased. So the recent, persistent
overprediction of inflation is unusual.
Why should we be concerned about bad in-
flation forecasts?  For one thing, the private sec-
tor uses inflation forecasts in a number of ways,
from businesses that print catalogs showing
their prices, to lenders who set interest rates
*Dean Croushore is an assistant vice president and
economist in the Research Department of the Federal Re-
serve Bank of Philadelphia. He is also head of the
department’s macroeconomics section.
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depending on what they think inflation will be
in the future. If those inflation forecasts aren’t
very good, businesses and lenders will set
prices incorrectly, and such a mistake may be
costly to them and their customers.
In addition, inflation forecasts provide im-
portant information to policymakers who are
formulating monetary policy today. If forecasts
indicate a rise in inflation (if policy doesn’t
change), policymakers may wish to tighten
monetary policy now to keep inflation from ris-
ing.  Looking at forecasts helps policymakers
address the problem that monetary policy ac-
tions affect the economy with a lag: actions to-
day affect the inflation rate one to two years
from now.  So basing policy actions on forecasts
would be desirable if the forecasts were accu-
rate.  Unfortunately, the persistent errors in the
forecasts of inflation cast doubt on the value of
using those forecasts as a basis for making
policy.
Given the potential importance of inflation
forecasts for policymak-
ers and the good track
record of forecasters
prior to the 1990s, what
explains the erroneous
forecasts of the last six
years?  Has something
changed in the way fore-
casters make their pre-
dictions? Or has the in-
flation process itself
changed?
RECENT INFLATION
AND FORECASTS
Inflation Has Been
Surprisingly Stable . . .
Perhaps the most re-
markable aspect of the
economic expansion
that’s been going on
since 1991 is that the in-
flation rate held fairly
steady for several years and has been declining
recently (Figure 1).1
The fact that the inflation rate has not risen
over the period shown in the figure is unusual,
at least when compared to recent experience.
Only two other economic expansions since
World War II lasted at least six years (1961 to
1969 and 1983 to 1990), and in both, inflation
was accelerating significantly by the sixth year.
In the 1961-69 expansion, the average annual
inflation rate rose from 1 percent in 1961 to
about 3 percent in 1967 and to more than 5 per-
FIGURE 1
The Inflation Rate
Four-Quarter-Ahead Average
1The figure shows the percentage change in the Con-
sumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U), which
is the most commonly forecasted measure of consumer
prices. It is averaged over a year to give a better picture of
the trend in inflation, since inflation data vary a lot from
month to month. The data points are four-quarter-ahead
moving averages; for example, the data point plotted for
1991Q2 is the inflation rate in the CPI-U from 1991Q2 to
1992Q2.
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cent in 1969. In the 1983-90 expansion, inflation
rose from 3 percent in 1983 to about 5 percent
in 1990.  But since the current economic expan-
sion began in 1991, inflation has remained re-
markably steady, about 3 percent or less.
. . .But Forecasters Predicted That Inflation
Would Rise.  Over the past six years, forecast-
ers have predicted an uptick in inflation, but
they’ve been consistently wrong. The typical
forecast during this expansion held that infla-
tion would creep up by about one-half of a per-
centage point over the coming year, for ex-
ample, from 3 to 3.5 percent.
Comparing forecasts of inflation since the
current expansion began with actual inflation
shows how persistently the forecasters have
missed the mark (Figure 2). To interpret the fig-
ure, look at the values for the second quarter of
1991 (where the "Forecast" and "Actual" lines
begin).  The value shown (3.8 percent) on the
“Forecast” line is the inflation forecast made in
the second quarter of 1991 for the average in-
flation rate from that date to the second quar-
ter of 1992.2   The value shown (3.1 percent) on
the “Actual” line is the actual inflation rate from
the second quarter of 1991 to the second quar-
ter of 1992.
The line showing the actual inflation rate is
almost always below the line showing the fore-
cast, which means forecasters persistently pre-
dicted a rise in the inflation rate that never
materialized.  The average forecast error (the
forecast of the inflation rate minus the actual
inflation rate) is about 0.4 percentage points.
Actual inflation was 2.9 percent on average,
while the forecast of inflation was 3.3 percent
on average.3
Examining the quarterly pattern of the fore-
casts in more detail shows even more clearly
that forecasters expected inflation to rise. A typi-
cal example can be seen in the forecast that was
made in the second quarter of 1992 (Figure 3).
2The forecasts come from the Survey of Professional Fore-
casters, a quarterly survey pro-
duced by the Federal Reserve
Bank of Philadelphia that covers
a wide variety of macroeco-
nomic variables, including con-
sumer price inflation. The par-
ticipants are forecasters on Wall
Street, at banks, at corporations,
and in consulting firms. For
more details on the survey, see
my 1993 article, “Introducing:
The Survey of Professional Fore-
casters,” or visit the Philadelphia
Fed’s Web site at ‘http://
www.phil.frb.org/econ/spf/
spfpage.html’.
3The only time the forecast
was below actual inflation oc-
curred in 1995Q4 and 1996Q1,
because unexpectedly high in-
creases in food and energy prices
in 1996 caused the actual infla-
tion rate to exceed the forecast.
But in every other quarter, the
forecast exceeded the actual in-
flation rate.
FIGURE 2
The Inflation Rate
Four-Quarter-Ahead Average
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In this diagram, the points plotted are the me-
dian forecasts for the inflation rate for the cur-
rent quarter (1992Q2) and each of the next four
quarters, compared with the actual inflation
rate in each quarter. The figure shows that in-
flation, which had been 2.7 percent in the first
quarter of 1992, was expected to rise gradually
over time. The forecasters thought inflation
would be 3.3 percent in 1992Q2, 3.35 percent in
1992Q3, 3.5 percent in 1992Q4, 3.55 percent in
1993Q1, and 3.7 percent in 1993Q2. In fact, in-
flation turned out to be lower than forecast in
every quarter except 1992Q4.
WHY WERE THE FORECASTS SO HIGH?
We can’t know for sure why forecasts for in-
flation have been consistently too high in the
1990s. To determine possible reasons, let’s look
at four different methods for forecasting infla-
tion to see what forecasters might have missed:
(1) the cost model, in which increases in the
costs of producing
goods translate into
higher prices; (2) histori-
cal correlations, in which
forecasters look at how
inflation typically moves
over the course of the
business cycle; (3) de-
mand-side and supply-
side models, in which
forecasters examine
changes in aggregate de-
mand and supply to de-
termine their impact on
inflation; and (4) the
monetary model, in
which inflation is di-
rectly affected by the de-
gree of tightness of mon-
etary policy.
The Cost Model. One
method of forecasting
inflation is to examine
the cost of producing
goods. According to this theory, if production
costs begin to grow at a faster rate, firms pass
on the higher costs in the form of higher prices
of goods, and the inflation rate increases. The
question then is, what causes production costs
to rise faster? One explanation is based on an
economic construct called the Phillips curve,
which relates inflation to unemployment.
When labor markets get tight—that is, there
aren’t many qualified workers available—firms
increase wages more rapidly, and the cost of
producing goods rises faster.  This theory leads
to the notion that the economy has a natural
rate of unemployment, or a non-accelerating-
inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU). The
Phillips curve model suggests that when the
nation’s unemployment rate is less than the
natural rate, inflation will rise.  Similarly, if
unemployment rises above the natural rate,
inflation will decline.
With this type of model, it’s clear why fore-
FIGURE 3
The Inflation Rate
Actual vs. Forecast/Quarterly
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casters were predicting that inflation would rise
from 1994 on (though not before that). Most
estimates in the early 1990s set the natural rate
of unemployment at about 6 percent. The un-
employment rate fell below that level in 1994.
Consequently, many forecasters became
alarmed about the prospects of a rise in infla-
tion at that time. But the unemployment rate
continued to decline. After averaging 6.1 per-
cent in 1994, it fell to an average of 5.6 percent
in 1995, then to 5.4 percent in 1996, and it was
below 5.0 percent through most of 1997. Those
forecasters who used a Phillips curve model
thus produced forecasts of an increasing infla-
tion rate.
However, as inflation continued to be be-
nign, forecasters began to rethink their views
on the natural rate of unemployment. They
observed both low inflation and significant
changes in the labor force, which made them
realize that the natural rate of unemployment
was probably less than 6 percent. So, over time,
a number of forecasters have lowered their es-
timate of the natural rate of unemployment, and
they are no longer predicting as large a rise in
inflation.4
The fact that forecasters began to change
their views about the level of the natural rate
of unemployment led economists Doug Staiger,
Jim Stock, and Mark Watson to investigate how
the natural rate should be estimated. In their
paper “The NAIRU, Unemployment, and Mon-
etary Policy,” they found that estimates of the
natural rate are quite imprecise.  A forecaster
has no more basis for using an estimate of the
natural rate of unemployment of 6 percent than
one of 5.5 percent. The natural rate may be
somewhere in that neighborhood, but those
estimates could easily be off by a percentage
point or more.
How does uncertainty about the natural rate
of unemployment affect the models of the
Phillips curve that forecasters use? If something
happens in the economy that reduces the natu-
ral rate, but the forecasters are unaware of this
event, their models will use too high a value
for the natural rate. As the unemployment rate
drops below their estimate of the natural rate,
forecasters may think inflation will rise, but they
would be wrong.
What factors might have caused the natural
rate of unemployment to decline?  One notable
feature of the 1990s is an increased willingness
by corporations to lay off workers, especially
at the managerial level (for evidence, see the
article by Rob Valletta).  This change, in turn,
has affected workers’ attitudes toward their jobs
and led them to reduce demands for higher
wages for fear of being “downsized.” Such a
change in attitude is likely to have reduced the
natural rate of unemployment, since workers
won’t demand higher wages even when the
unemployment rate is very low.
Thus, one explanation of the errors in fore-
casting inflation, at least since 1994, may be the
failure of forecasters to modify their Phillips
curve models of inflation to reflect a lower natu-
ral rate of unemployment.
One other major influence on firms’ produc-
tion costs that may also have played a role in
the 1990s in keeping production costs down is
the effort to control the cost of health benefits.
While benefit costs rose much more rapidly
4The natural rate of unemployment represents the un-
employment rate when the economy is operating at full
capacity. Two groups of people would still be unemployed
in such a situation:  (1) those who may not have the skills
needed for employment (for example, people who have
worked in an industry that’s shrinking and who need ad-
ditional training to get another job); and (2) those who are
simply between jobs but unlikely to be unemployed for
long. Both structural (the first case) and frictional (the sec-
ond case) unemployment are necessary consequences of a
growing economy in which there’s always change and tech-
nical progress.  The natural rate of unemployment can
change whenever either structural or frictional unemploy-
ment changes. For example, the natural rate of unemploy-
ment rose in the late 1970s because the oil price shocks to
the economy reduced the need for workers in industries,
such as the auto industry, that depend on low oil prices.
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than wages and salaries from 1988 to 1994, the
situation has been reversed over the past three
years, mostly because of changes in health ben-
efits.  So firms’ costs haven’t been rising as rap-
idly on the health-benefits front, thus putting
less pressure on firms to raise prices. To the
extent that forecasters haven’t accounted for the
decline in health costs, their inflation forecasts
may be off the mark.
Historical Correlations.  Some forecasting
models are based on what many people assume
to be a fact—that inflation tends to rise as ex-
pansions get longer. As we’ve already seen, in
the long expansions of the 1960s and 1980s, in-
flation accelerated as time passed. As a result,
many economists take it on faith that inflation
rises as an economic expansion continues.
But just because our history contains two
episodes in which inflation rose as the economic
expansion continued doesn’t mean it must al-
ways be so. Indeed, some recent empirical re-
search challenges this notion. In a 1991 article,
“The Cyclical Behavior of Prices,” Tom Cooley
and Lee Ohanian found many periods in U.S.
history in which inflation didn’t rise during
expansions.5 In fact, they found that it isn’t clear
whether the best forecast is for inflation to rise
or to fall during expansions. This research sur-
prised many economists who had taken the rise
of inflation during expansions as fact.6
This line of research makes it clear that if fore-
casters assume that inflation will rise as an eco-
nomic expansion goes on, they are ignoring
important evidence to the contrary. They need
to look deeper and investigate the roles of sup-
ply and demand in the overall economy.
Demand- and Supply-Side Factors.  The is-
sue of whether an expansion is primarily driven
by increases in demand or supply is crucial in
determining what happens to inflation.  Many
inflation models suggest that inflation (or the
increase in the inflation rate) depends on how
fast the economy is growing relative to poten-
tial growth. So if the economy’s potential
growth rate changes, the economy can grow
faster without higher inflation. What may have
happened in the 1990s is that the potential
growth rate of the economy increased, but fore-
casters didn’t recognize it. As a result, they
thought the economy was growing faster than
it should have, so they thought inflation would
rise.
One view of the economy holds that when
demand outstrips supply at existing prices,
prices are bid up to a higher level until demand
equals supply. Thus, if supply is stable and
some factor increases demand, we’d expect in-
flation to rise; if some factor reduces demand,
we’d expect inflation to decline. Thus, it isn’t
really supply or demand alone that determines
inflation, but a combination of the two.
In the 1990s, as the economy has grown faster
than expected, forecasters may have thought
that demand for goods was outstripping sup-
5Examining the movement of inflation during expan-
sions involves identifying cycles in inflation relative to its
trend, which can be a tricky business. The idea is that if
prices are growing 3 percent, on average, over time, we
want to see if they’re above or below their trend line in
expansions. If the trend isn’t stable over time, a number of
alternative methods can be used to estimate the trend, but
it isn’t clear which method is best.
6Not all economists believe that Cooley and Ohanian’s
research is the final word. First, Bankim Chadha and Eswar
Prasad found evidence that inflation did rise, on average,
during expansions. But their results depend on this tricky
business of taking out the trend, as discussed in footnote 5.
John Judd and Bharat Trehan suggested that looking at
simple correlations between inflation and output (as Cooley
and Ohanian, as well as Chadha and Prasad, had done) is
misleading. Using a simple example, they showed that such
a correlation can’t answer the question of whether infla-
tion rises in expansions, because that correlation depends
on the timing of the movements in output and prices, not
their overall direction.   Instead, a more detailed statistical
analysis is needed, focusing on whether supply-side fac-
tors (what people produce) or demand-side factors (what
people buy) are the dominant force in the expansion.
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ply, and thus they would expect an increase in
the inflation rate. For example, many forecast-
ers thought the economy would grow at a rate
of 2 to 2.5 percent in 1995, 1996, and 1997. They
were about right in 1995, when the economy
grew 2 percent. But in 1996, the economy grew
nearly 3 percent, and it grew nearly 4 percent
in 1997. So forecasters may have thought that
inflation was likely to increase over the past two
years, since demand was outstripping supply.
In fact, inflation declined between 1995 and
1997, so supply-side factors must have come
into play.
The three most important supply-side fac-
tors are growth of the labor force, productivity,
and foreign competition. All have changed in
ways that increased supply in the mid-1990s.
As an example of a surprising change in the
growth of the labor force, consider the welfare
reform bill of 1996. This bill led to an increase
in the labor force that carried over into 1997:
people at the lower end of the income scale
entered the workforce in increased numbers.
An estimate by Mary Daly suggests that the
welfare reform bill caused the labor force to
increase by 300,000 within the first year.
Economists had been predicting that growth
in the labor force would slow down beginning
in 1996; some economists even predicted that
the labor force would grow by less than 1 mil-
lion people in 1996 and again in 1997. In fact,
the rise in the number of people in the labor
force exceeded 2 million and employment grew
even more—over 2.5 million—in both years.
This surprising growth in the number of people
working was a major factor behind the fast pace
of the economy in 1996 and 1997.
Another supply-side source of economic
growth is productivity. As workers become
more productive, the economy’s output rises.
A look at the statistics is discouraging, since our
national income accounts show productivity
growing at a rather slow rate over the past 20
years.  But is it really growing that slowly? To
the casual observer, productivity appears to be
exploding, especially since computer technolo-
gies are making rapid advances. So why are the
statistics on productivity so bleak?
One theory is that our official statistics
mismeasure productivity growth. It’s hard to
calculate how valuable new computers are, and
it’s difficult to evaluate the improvement in
productivity that a new, but expensive, piece
of medical equipment generates. And it’s nearly
impossible to evaluate productivity gains in the
service sector. How much more does a lawyer
do now than she did 10 years ago? How much
has her ability to investigate legal questions
improved in the on-line age? Does her constant
availability by pager and cell phone make her
more productive for her clients?
Economists like Leonard Nakamura think
that these measurement issues are of primary
importance. In his 1997 article, “Is the U.S.
Economy Really Growing Too Slowly?  Maybe
We’re Measuring Growth Wrong,” he argues
that, in fact, the U.S. economy has been doing
much better than the official statistics show.
According to Nakamura, the government data
overstate inflation and understate productiv-
ity and economic growth. Over the last 20 years,
U.S. output and productivity growth may have
been as much as two percentage points higher
per year than the official statistics indicate. And
the mismeasurement has been increasing in the
last few years. If that’s right, the economy
should be able to grow rapidly without caus-
ing inflation.
A final supply-side factor comes from for-
eign competition. In the 1990s, U.S. firms, es-
pecially in the manufacturing sector, have com-
peted in increasingly global markets.  Increased
competition from foreign firms may have
caused firms to set their prices lower and re-
duced profit margins (compared with what
they would have been in the absence of that
competition).
In addition, since early 1995 the dollar has
been rising, on average, against other curren-
cies. The rise in the dollar reduces the price of
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imports into the United States, so U.S. firms that
compete in the same markets as foreign firms
must cut their prices to remain competitive.
Again, the effect is likely to help reduce infla-
tion.
All of these supply-side factors have been
pushing inflation down in the 1990s, especially
over the last few years. To the extent that fore-
casters didn’t anticipate these factors, their in-
flation forecasts were too high.
The Monetary and Financial Model. One fi-
nal method used to forecast inflation is the mon-
etary model, which is best described by Milton
Friedman’s famous maxim, “Inflation is always
and everywhere a monetary phenomenon.” Ac-
cording to Friedman and other monetarists,
what matters for inflation is not the growth rate
of the economy but the growth rate of the
money supply. Forecasters from the monetar-
ist school look at the growth rate of the money
supply as an indicator
of future inflation.
These days, finan-
cial innovation has
made it difficult to in-
terpret the growth rate
of the money supply
itself, but other eco-
nomic variables pro-
vide some indication of
whether monetary
policy is easy or tight.7
One indicator of the
stance of monetary
policy is the difference between the interest rate
on the 10-year U.S. government bond and the
interest rate on three-month Treasury bills. The
bigger this difference, the easier the stance of
monetary policy. Since 1994 this difference has
been lower than it usually is in expansions (Fig-
ure 4).
Another important indicator of monetary
policy is the real federal funds rate—the nomi-
nal interest rate on overnight loans between
banks minus the expected inflation rate.  The
higher the real federal funds rate is, the tighter
monetary policy is. Again, the data show that
the real federal funds rate has been a bit higher
over the past few years than its average in the
1970s (Figure 5).8  That’s good, because the
FIGURE 4
Interest Rate Spread
Interest Rate on 10-Year Treasury Bond Minus Interest Rate
on 3-Month Treasury Bill
7For example, in 1996, the
M1 measure of the money
supply (which includes cur-
rency and deposits in check-
ing accounts) fell 4.6 percent
while the M2 measure of the
money supply (which in-
cludes M1, savings accounts,
and small savings deposits)
grew 4.3 percent.
8The figure shows the federal funds rate minus the one-
year-ahead expected inflation rate from the Survey of Pro-
fessional Forecasters.
Source: Federal Reserve series of constant maturities, secondary markets.
Years
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1970s were a time when inflation accelerated.
But the real federal funds rate in the 1990s isn’t
quite as high as it was in the 1980s.  In the early
1980s, when the real federal funds rate was very
high, inflation declined significantly.  Later in
the 1980s, when the real federal funds rate was
about as high as it is now, inflation was fairly
stable.
All these indicators point to tighter monetary
policy in the 1990s than is usual in expansions.
Thus monetary policy itself may be at least
partly responsible for keeping inflation from
rising. To the extent that forecasters misread the
stance of monetary policy or relied too much
on historical correlations or the Phillips curve,
their forecasts called for higher inflation.
CONCLUSION
We’ve seen that inflation has been much
lower in the 1990s than forecasters expected.
FIGURE 5
Real Federal Funds Rate
Over the last six years, forecasters have con-
tinually predicted that inflation would rise, but
it hasn’t. It’s difficult to figure out the exact
source of their forecasting errors, but it’s likely
to be a combination of many factors. They may
have based their forecasts on a cost view of in-
flation, using a Phillips curve, but not realized
that the natural rate of unemployment was de-
clining. They may have looked at historical cor-
relations and assumed (incorrectly) that infla-
tion always rises in expansions. They may have
failed to take supply-side factors, such as in-
creased growth in the labor supply, increased
productivity, and foreign competition, suffi-
ciently into account. And they may have failed
to account completely for the degree of tight-
ness of monetary policy.
With all of these considerations affecting in-
flation and forecasts of inflation, how should
monetary policymakers react? The fact that in-
flation forecasts have
been too high makes
policymakers wary of
basing decisions solely on
such forecasts.
But if policymakers
don’t use forecasts, what
do they do? They moni-
tor the tightness of mon-
etary policy, using a vari-
ety of financial indicators.
They keep an eye on both
supply and demand fac-
tors and do not assume
that a rise in demand will
necessarily bring higher
inflation.  Finally, policy-
makers realize that while
Phillips curves and other
methods of examining
production costs have
proven useful histori-
cally, they are difficult to
use for forecasting infla-
tion.
Source: Federal funds rate adjusted by one-year-ahead expectations of GDP price
index from the Survey of Professional Forecasters.
Years
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